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I. Research Scope 
 
The abolishment of the internal border checks makes it easier for people to move 
around. We can travel freely in the Schengen area, which makes for economic, regional 
and cultural dynamism within Europe and especially at the border areas.  Any foreign 
visitor can travel to all Schengen States on a single visa. At the same time, the Schengen 
cooperation aims to protect people and their property, since it fosters the cooperation 
among police forces, customs authorities and external border control authorities of the 
Member States in order to decrease the security deficit formed with the abolition of 
internal borders. The Schengen acquis provides systems of communication for police 
forces, hot pursuit of criminals and the cross-border surveillance of suspects, as well as 
mutual operational assistance and direct exchanges of information among police 
authorities. In parallel, strict uniform rules have been adopted to ensure the protection of 
data and to protect people against any infringement of their fundamental rights. Moreover, 
mutual assistance in criminal matters lays more emphasis on consequences of law 
breaching promoting the work of law enforcement agencies with cross-border deterrence. 
Borderless Europe raises the problem of increased security deficit. One of its 
segments may be counterbalanced by the control of immigration flow at the external 
borders that consists of three endeavours: the common border control policy, the common 
visa policy and the common asylum policy. The aim of the current research is to 
understand internal security and migration policies of the European Union (hereinafter: 
EU) through observing eu-LISA1, the sole European Agency being a law enforcement 
large-scale IT system. Observing what kind of social preferences are reflected through 
the Agency, the EU internal security and migration policies can be more sophisticatedly 
characterised. The primary question is stretched by analysing all relevant law 
enforcement large-scale IT systems, i.e. those operating in the area of freedom, security 
and justice. 
All policy areas are supported by systems that gather and store systematic data in 
order to satisfy criminal law claims deriving from the risk of breaching rated acquis and 
even national provisions. Therefore, the aggregated claims of nation states has resulted in 
large-scale systems filling the perceived the security gap of borderless Europe. Gathering 
and storing systematic data in mass volume, it is reasonable to encompass the 
                                                          
1 Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and 
justice. 
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advancement of information technology. The fact, that each policy area created its own 
large-scale IT system operating in the area of freedom, security and justice is called the 
exploitation of information power. It means that the European Union established the legal 
instruments for large-scale IT systems supporting law enforcement, which are embodied 
as the Schengen Information System (hereinafter: SIS), the Visa Information System 
(hereinafter: VIS) and the European Dactylographic System (hereinafter: EURODAC). 
On the whole, irregular migrants found in Member States can be registered in the SIS, 
but irregular migration defies this registration itself. The SIS was further developed 
establishing the Second Generation of the Schengen Information System (hereinafter: SIS 
II). Those who enter through asylum procedures are registered in EURODAC and those 
who enter using a legal channel, i.e. being issued a visa are registered by the VIS. 
The consideration of the integration of all these systems into one “European 
Information System” is not a new desire.2 The creation of a Big Brother Agency, as it was 
trendy to refer to, opened up the possibility to use information power more concentrated 
desiring to contribute more effectively to fight against terrorism, organised crime, human 
trafficking and irregular immigration. The Agency for the operational management of 
large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice, which is the so-called 
eu-LISA, implements a cohabitation of the existing systems using multilevel  governance 
which is separated on operational level. The Agency is regulated by the so-called eu-
LISA Regulation.3 
The multitude of existing and even the planned systems raises the problem of their 
connectedness with each other and with Justice and Home Affairs Agencies (hereinafter: 
JHA Agencies).4 Moreover, it is very topical to understand the underlying social 
processes catalysing the establishment of such systems. This is the key motive behind the 
current research, i.e. understanding the emergence of the systems, interpreting them in 
their environment and defining their relevance in EU internal security and migration 
policies that together may help comprehend their reflected societal patterns. 
                                                          
2 Broeders, Dennis, “The New Digital Borders of Europe – EU Database and the Surveillance of Irregular 
Migrants”, International Sociology, 22(1), 2007, pp. 71-92. 
3 Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice, OJ L 286, 1.11.2011, pp. 1-17. 
4 The author deliberately uses JHA Agencies aiming at referring to the time of their establishments. As of 
writing, the Agencies are operating in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
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Eu-LISA according to the author’s view has a double aim to deal with. On the one 
hand, internal security of Schengenland shall be supported. On the other hand, the Agency 
has designated role in relation to the management of migration flows. 
The aim of the current research is to understand internal security and migration 
policies of the European Union through observing eu-LISA as the sole European Agency 
being a law enforcement large-scale IT system. Observing what kind of social preferences 
are reflected through the Agency, the EU internal security and migration policies can be 
more sophisticatedly characterised. 
It means that the main focus of the research is to define what social preferences 
are reflected through eu-LISA which is interpreted as a law enforcement large-scale IT 
system. 
 
II. Methodology and Analysis 
 
For the analysis, a methodological tool is developed proposing the relative 
measurement of three indicators such as accountability for acts, respect of human rights 
standards and transparent operation. Indicators are examined through the development 
process of the units of analysis (institutionalist approach) and through analysing the 
interactions among them and their environment (functionalist approach). 
It is also conjectured in line with the proposed methodological tool that analysing 
the above three indicators the relationship of the examined law enforcement large-scale 
IT system with social beneficiality can be determined. Since it is a double conjecture, i.e. 
indirect inference, it shall be challenged to be proven. Testing this projection capacity, 
the tool is applied to comparable planned and other, related law enforcement large-scale 
IT systems operating in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
The received results characterise reflected social preferences and social 
beneficiality if presumptions and limitations are accepted. In this way, the proposed 
methodological tool may be used for social measurement related to law enforcement 
large-scale IT systems. 
In the flow of the European integration, the so-called large-scale IT systems, 
namely SIS, VIS and EURODAC were established to support the realisation of 
Community/Union policies in relation to immigration, visa, asylum and free movement 
of persons within the Schengen area. The systems are highly important for the border 
5 
security strategy, since among others the systematic data gathering and data exchange of 
information concerning, inter alia, third country nationals happen through them. 
Examining their roots as well as their relations to EU treaties could support the 
current analysis with findings on characterising social preferences and motives behind 
them. Such examination is inevitable, since the integration of the systems into eu-LISA 
poses the question of approached treaty arrangement. For an effective governance of 
agencies, common denominators of agents’ legal basis are needed to be established 
otherwise the new governing structure turns out to be an ivory tower of red tape and of 
inconsistent decisions. 
In order to be able to use the proposed methodological tool extendedly to all 
segments of EU law enforcement large-scale systems, it shall be examined whether the 
joint operational management of existing specific law enforcement large-scale IT systems 
changed their functioning. Henceforward it is fundamental to consider how the newest 
segment of EU law enforcement large-scale IT systems’ joint operational management 
contributes to EU migration and internal security policies. 
Breaking the above analysis down, firstly, it is worth considering why the 
establishment of the Agency was legally predetermined, since the previous hints for its 
establishment points out perceived security deficit. Moreover, options for its installations 
may serve as points of reference. 
Then it is essential to understand the aims and the basic tasks of eu-LISA in order 
to evaluate its scope taking into account the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
Focusing on general and governance structure of eu-LISA, its legal basis is analysed. It 
raises the problem of the territorial scope affecting on its governance structure. 
Finally, the relationship of eu-LISA with other EU agencies is observed. 
Therefore, a subsection concentrates on the legal instruments of the SIS II, VIS and 
EURODAC in order to identify the EU level agencies that have access to and/or influence 
on the large-scale IT systems. The status of these organisations is defined in the everyday 
work of eu-LISA. For that, a layer model is presented to highlight the interrelations. 
In line with the proposed methodological tool, these systems has been measured 
using the three established indicators that characterise social preferences reflected 
through these systems onto EU migration and internal security policies. Having these 
patterns, social beneficiality of the existing systems has been estimated by indirectly 
inferring from the statement, that transparency shall balance accountability without 
prejudice of human rights, which may constellate an optimal institutional arrangement. 
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The received results derived from social preferences are double conjectured, so 
that they shall be challenged to be proven. Thus, it has been proposed that observing 
planned and other, related law enforcement large-scale IT systems operating in the area 
of freedom, security and justice, the projection capacity of the proposed methodological 
tool can be tested. Projection capacity in this context means the capacity of the above 
established indicators (accountability for acts, respect of human rights standards and 
transparent operation) to determine social beneficiality of the observed system. The test 
here equals to the comparison of social preferences reflected through the existing, the 
planned and other, related law enforcement large-scale IT systems operating in the area 
of freedom, security and justice. 
Firstly, the comparability of the existing, the planned and other, related systems 
shall be examined. Deriving from the characteristics of the existing ones, the mentioned 
systems are comparable if they tackle the same challenges of the area of freedom, security 
and justice. In this context, it means balancing security needs of Schengenland and 
facilitating people movement within, to and outwards the area by using information 
power. To handling the dichotomy, an analogy is needed as benchmark. For the purpose, 
EU return and readmission policy is adequate, since it handles security perspective as 
long as dealing with competing provisions of the right to leave and of the obligation to 
(re)admit to facilitate (mainly forced) migration flows. Therefore, benchmarking for 
comparability is to be elaborated first. 
Then, planned and other, related systems shall be selected for comparison. While 
it should be borne in mind that eu-LISA is capable of incorporating the operational 
management of further law enforcement large-scale IT systems regardless of current 
arrangements. 
If comparability is proven and all relevant EU law enforcement large-scale IT 
systems are selected, the design of these systems, i.e. institutional arrangements are 
analysed aiming at establishing and ordering them around the three above indicators of 
accountability for acts, respect of human rights standards and transparent operation. 
Determining social preferences, social beneficiality of the concerned systems is 
ascertained based on the proposed methodological tool. 
If the same social preference patterns come out of the analyses of existing and of 
planned and other, related systems, the social beneficiality of the existing law 
enforcement large-scale IT systems can be determined based on and accepting the 
presumptions of the proposed methodological tool. Therefore, the last step is the 
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comparison of results coming from the examination of systems. In this way, indirect 
interference of indicators’ projection capacity is challenged. 
 
III. Results 
 
The outlined development process of existing law enforcement large-scale IT 
systems operating in the area of freedom, security and justice shows a reactive attitude, 
i.e. reactive to perceived security challenges. Their development process is decidedly 
inherent although relevant cooperation started out of EC/EU treaty regime. It is also 
supported by the fact that the systems were created separately but they keep on entering 
into more enhanced interaction with each other and with their environment. 
The smart, appropriate combination of the judicious use of information 
technology with the discriminating and sensible patterns of intelligence cooperation could 
guarantee that activities of security and intelligence organizations do not erode the 
qualities of freedom in a democracy; instead, they can sustain and extend liberties.5 
Evaluating an observed law enforcement large-scale IT system’s optimality 
following the measurement along the three indicators, it is important that the indicators 
shall balance each other. The reason for it derives from the starting point. In democratic 
theories, the Dahlian ‘polyarchy’, i.e. the pluralist interplay of groups is viewed as 
democracy. HUNTINGTON worried about a ‘democratic distemper’ in which citizens 
demand more than the system can deliver.6 Therefore, that transparency shall balance 
accountability without prejudice of human rights, which may constellate an optimal 
institutional arrangement. 
Society’s acceptance of new technologies in law enforcement has three levels such 
as the technology and research, the technology and privacy, and the technology and 
society.7 Concerns with a new technology will decrease if that technology is fully 
integrated and accepted in the society. Social measurement of law enforcement large-
scale IT systems may be of assistance in relation to the evaluation of their level of 
acceptance as well. 
                                                          
5 Aldrich, Richard, J., “Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation”, International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 80(4), p. 736. 
6 See also: Hosein, Ann (ed.), Political Science, “The Britannica Guide to the Social Sciences”, 1st ed., 
Britannica Educational Publishing and Rosen Publishing, New York, 2016, pp. 28-30. 
7 Pattavina, April (ed.), Information Technology and the Criminal Justice System, University of 
Massachusetts at Lowell, Sage Publications, 2005, pp. 261-271. 
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Respect of human rights standards has been interpreted alone, inside the systems. 
Accountability for acts indicator has dealt with internal and external factors. Transparent 
operation has focused on the environment of the systems. Results of the indicators cannot 
be interpreted in absolute terms, i.e. it is rather a philosophical question to establish levels 
for how good their functioning is. Therefore, the relative relationship of the indicator 
results is proposed to be measured. For this, a simple but appropriate tool is chosen. 
Patterns of all the systems drawn up by the indicators are summed up via a SWOT 
analysis. 
The centralisation of operational management is a strength, since focused 
knowledge and sufficient personal resources might be an advantage in the daily work with 
the systems including the monitoring of only one operator instead of three different 
databases. The institutionalisation of the operational management creates clear ground 
for the accountability.  The accountability of eu-LISA is ensured by EU institutions. 
Furthermore, the Agency provides a visible and dedicated structure that is also more 
visible and approachable for the civil society. The long-term cost efficiency is guaranteed 
by the fostered usage of the same technical solutions and by the preparation, development 
and operational management tasks related to other IT large-scale systems, which might 
be delegated to eu-LISA. The expenditures and the running costs are managed together. 
Many of the tasks related to the running of the systems, procurement and project 
management are overlapped for all of the systems managed by the Agency; meanwhile 
less staff shall be employed. Furthermore, the co-location of network installations also 
indicates synergies in installations, operational management and monitoring. 
Conversely, the accommodation of the so-called la géométrie variable is a 
weakness in the future operation of the systems, since eu-LISA has to handle a complex 
matrix of legal environment where too many parties are involved on different legal bases 
and where not all parties use or participate in all segments of the Agency’s work. 
Furthermore, the Agency is not cost-efficient in short-term. The costs and time of setting 
up the Agency and the transition to new location (i.e. to the new Tallinn headquarters) 
result in the loss of key staff, training costs and could result in delays in planning and 
deployment; which means discontinuity. In short-term, there are also high overheads that 
would eventually decrease. These overheads could be the insufficient critical mass of 
operational activity to justify setting up dedicated governance and management structures 
which result in extra labour costs and redundancy at administrative level; since the long 
start-up time for the establishment of the Agency’s organisation, due to legislative 
9 
procedures and discussion about location, governance structure, employment of staff 
could result in delays, staff turnover and probably additional maintenance costs to keep 
old hardware running. However, these significant start-up costs would be compensated 
by the achievement of a higher potential for exploiting operational synergies. The 
operational management of these systems would be more cost-effective in the long run. 
The Agency could prepare, develop and manage other large-scale IT systems, too. 
It is a great achievement, a valuable opportunity concerning the operational management 
of large-scale IT systems, since the Agency creates a cost-effective institutional 
framework for the future development of new large-scale IT systems, for the integration 
of the other existing ones and for the further development of the SIS II, VIS and 
EURODAC. 
Concerns which have been voiced about the possible creation of a “big brother 
agency” are in relation to the possibility of function creep and the issue of interoperability. 
Function creep by the Agency can be avoided if the scope of (possible) activities of the 
Agency are limited and clearly defined in the founding legal instrument. The application 
of ordinary legislative procedure decreased the risk of this factor. The eu-LISA 
Regulation is clear and enumerates well-defined tasks. However, the possibility of 
function creep is a clear threat. In any case, the risk that one day the different systems 
will be directly interconnected since they are using the same infrastructure and it is 
technically feasible to do so, should be considered. Indirect interconnectedness may 
distort aim-assigned operation of the systems causing serious disproportionality. 
Moreover, the potential threat that may fundamentally change the nature of the existing 
EU law enforcement large-scale IT systems is interoperability, that is, as of now, 
prohibited “unless so provided in a specific legal basis”. 8 Having VIS and EURODAC 
relation concerning the determination of the country responsible for the examination of 
an asylum application and the examination of an asylum application, having aslo SIS II 
and VIS relation in connection with enforcing entry ban, and having the recently 
established VIS and EURODAC relation concerning conditions for access in case of law 
enforcement purposes, indirect interconnectedness of EU law enforcement large-scale IT 
systems is observed on the management level. 
Establishing that what socially beneficial is based on the above examined criteria 
and aspects, the establishment of eu-LISA has economic advantages in the long run. The 
                                                          
8 Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011, op. cit., Art. 1(4), p. 6. 
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highlighted strengths and the opportunities constitute the added-value of the Agency, 
which are the followings: the preparation, management and development of other IT 
systems; long-term cost efficiency; centralisation and institutionalisation of the 
operational management of the large-scale IT systems; visibility and approachability for 
the civil society. These enumerated attributions have a clear connotation to the increase 
of efficiency of the information power in particular to the tendency for connectedness. 
The establishment of eu-LISA and the development of the large-scale IT systems in the 
area of freedom, security and justice contribute to the decrease of the security deficit 
according to the examined aspects, criteria and processes, and regarding the 
presuppositions. 
Again, transparency shall balance accountability without prejudice of human 
rights, which may constellate an optimal institutional arrangement. The potential threat 
that may fundamentally change the nature of the existing EU law enforcement large-scale 
IT systems is interoperability. The tendency for interoperability is paved by indirect 
interconnectedness. Moreover, taking the management level of the layer model, it is also 
debatable that the whereabouts of the transferred data are often not clarified, e.g. into 
which databases the data are introduced and which third parties get access to the data. It 
is not explained before the data transfer. It is again underlined that different accessing 
actors may lead to extension of authorities possibly using the transferred data. Time limits 
for storing the data in the original database may also be extended by the data transfer to 
other databases.9 Moreover, less unsatisfactory data transfer is observable not only on the 
management but also on the cooperation level. 
All in all, economies of scale and security orientation compromise the respect of 
human rights standards. Therefore, according to the proposed methodological tool, 
institutional arrangements are not constellated optimally concerning social beneficiality. 
However, the eu-LISA Regulation guarantees the involvement of public interest, 
the data protection and the security rules on the protection of classified information and 
non-classified sensitive information; and regulates the access to documents.10 On the one 
hand, after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the fundamental rights and 
freedoms shall be more carefully respected by the European institutions. On the other 
                                                          
9 Boehm, Franziska, Information Sharing and Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: Towards Harmonised Data Protection Principles for Information Exchange at EU-level, 
Heidelberg, Springer, 2012, p. 369. 
10 Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011, op. cit., Art. 21, 28, 29 and 26, pp. 13-14. 
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hand, accountability of the European Agencies is ensured by the European Parliament 
and the European Data Protection Supervisor. Furthermore, the European Court of 
Justice11 and national courts have full jurisdiction over eu-LISA activities. 
The so far outlined development process of existing law enforcement large-scale 
IT systems operating in the area of freedom, security and justice shows a reactive attitude, 
i.e. reactive to perceived security challenges. Their development process is decidedly 
inherent although relevant cooperation stated out of EC/EU treaty regime. It is also 
supported by the fact that the systems were created separately but they keep on entering 
into more enhanced interaction with each other and with their environment. 
To sum up social preferences of EU migration and internal security policies 
reflected through the systems, a more security-oriented pattern is observable that is 
reactive to the perceived threats from the environment. Therefore, in a non-pillar Europe, 
a unified management approach has been accepted to handle a commonly perceived 
challenge. For that, information power is used more extensively slowly approaching the 
existing systems. 
This process can be justified from the realist, sovereignty-based position. 
However, transparency and human rights shall not be compromised endlessly, since, as a 
greedy feature of intelligence, it is hard to establish how much surveillance is enough. 
It is crucial to pay attention to the limitations of the above results. BIGO established 
three universes for “(in)securitization practices of EU border control”.12 The 
military/navy universe deals with solid borders where borderline is interpreted as a wall. 
For the internal security universe, borders are management activity of filtering and 
sorting, thereby, borders are liquid. The database analysts’ universe is characterised by 
mobile borders and networked interoperable databases making borderlines smart and 
gaseous. Using his terminology, the current results shall be interpreted as observing 
gaseous borders with the mind-set of the internal security universe. 
To challenge the above results, comparable planned systems are the Entry/Exit 
System (hereinafter: EES) and the Registered Traveller Programme (hereinafter: RTP) 
restrictively to transparency due to its indirect and complementary relation to law 
enforcement purpose and patterns of PNRs13, which are limited due to the established 
                                                          
11 Ibid, Art. 24, p. 13. 
12 Bigo, Didier, “The (in)securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control: Military/Navy 
– border guards/police – database analysts”, Security Dialogue, 45(3), 2014, pp. 209-225, quoted from the 
title. 
13 PNR: Passenger Name Record. 
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theoretical framework of EU law enforcement large-scale IT systems. Therefore, the EU 
PNR is concerned to the extent of border crossings registration features, since its criminal 
intelligence tool potential shall be disregarded due to the established benchmark. 
According to the proposed methodological tool, it is conjectured that results 
reflected through the three above indicators can answer the question by characterising 
social preferences of EU internal security and migration policies in the current theoretical 
framework. Determining social preferences, social beneficiality of the concerned systems 
is ascertained. 
As far as the respect of human rights is concerned, EU PNR and EES are 
fundamentally different, since EU PNR uses unverified data for profiling purposes. Its 
results are used pre-emptively. In contrast, EES data contains biometrics, i.e. fingerprints 
and facial images aiming at sanctioning perpetrated overstayings. Based on profiling 
results of PNR data, persons may be denied for acts predicted to be committed by them. 
This clearly colludes with the presumption of innocence. However, PNR data shall be 
used aligned to the aims of prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime. So that the aim of the EU PNR Directive14 could be 
justified by countermeasuring serious security threat if its necessity and proportionality 
are proven. EES in its current state presumes that third country nationals enter the 
Schengen area for reside there irregularly. As for general principles of EES, the system 
could be used solely if it is appropriate, necessary and proportional to the tasks of the 
competent authority. However, it is proven to be not sufficiently detailed meeting the due 
process standard. 
Since EU PNR is a directive, accountability standards will be more precisely 
characterised in further national legislations. The New EES Proposal15 guarantees 
accountability on an appropriate level. 
The accommodation of la géométrie variable together with indirect 
interconnectedness and planned interoperability between the New EES and VIS concern 
transparent operation. Indirect interconnectedness and the planned interoperability may 
                                                          
14 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of 
passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 132-149. 
15 COM(2016) 194 final Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third 
country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union and 
determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulation 
(EC) No 767/2008 and Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011, Brussels, 6.4.2016. 
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distort aim-assigned operation of the systems causing serious disproportionality due to 
the multiple accessing actors. In case of the observed planned systems, the above results 
related to indirect interconnectedness may be justified by their complementary nature. 
The potential threat that may fundamentally change the nature of the EU law enforcement 
large-scale IT systems is interoperability. 
To sum up social preferences of EU migration and internal security policies 
reflected through the planned and other, related systems, the pattern is clear. The 
perceived security challenges may compromise human rights that are handled by a 
comprehensive use of information power. EU PNR erects virtual bastions all around 
external borders. However, it may be explained by counterbalancing serious crimes. The 
proposed EES would stigmatise third country nationals giving a comprehensive tool to 
law enforcement agencies to sanction and in that way manage the outflow of irregular 
migration. It cannot be justified unless all third country nationals are perceived as 
potential threats. Therefore, the doors of Schengen are closing in the name of a more 
secured and opened Europe. However, it is not a dichotomy, since the envisioned tools 
aim at the managerial selection of incoming persons by establishing who are desired. 
However, this utilitarian approach costs in terms of applied human rights standards. 
It means that the managerial attitude of selecting desired persons from migration 
flows and security orientation compromise the respect of human rights standards. So that, 
according to the proposed method local tool, the proposed institutional arrangements are 
not constellated optimally concerning social beneficiality. 
The proven comparability between the existing, the planned and  other, related 
EU law enforcement large-scale IT systems makes it possible to challenge the determined 
social beneficiality of the existing systems aiming at establishing the potential projection 
capacity of the proposed methodological tool. 
Concerning respect of human rights indicator, based on profiling results of PNR 
data, persons may be denied for acts predicted to be committed by them. It matches the 
universes established by BIGO.16 EES is in line with the process started by VIS. However, 
the collection of data on all third country nationals that may be used for law enforcement 
proposes stigmatises by presuming irregular stay. 
Accountability for acts criterion as long as EES arrangements are examined 
supports the reasoning of BOEHM in relation to her observations of potential harmonised 
                                                          
16 Bigo, Didier, The (in)securitization practices, op. cit., pp. 209-225. 
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data protection principles within the area of freedom, security and justice.17 It means that 
the same pattern is observed in case of the planned and the existing systems. 
The accommodation of la géométrie variable is more a TFEU Title V feature of 
the planned and existing systems in relation to transparency indicator. However, the found 
indirect interconnectedness and the planned interoperability may distort aim-assigned 
operation of the systems causing serious disproportionality due to the multiple accessing 
actors. In case of the observed planned systems, the above results related to indirect 
interconnectedness may be justified by their complementary nature. The potential threat 
that may fundamentally change the nature of the EU law enforcement large-scale IT 
systems is interoperability. 
Comparing social preferences that are reflected through the existing, the planned 
and other, related systems to EU migration and internal security policies assembling 
social beneficiality, in both cases it has been proven that the perceived security challenges 
that are handled by a comprehensive use of information power may compromise human 
rights. The security-oriented patterns are reactive to the perceived threats from the 
environment. The planned systems more comprehensively aim at the use of information 
power causing lowering potential of meeting high human rights standards. However, the 
planned systems are more complementarily interconnected indirectly with other systems. 
Moreover, the potential threat that may fundamentally change the nature of the EU law 
enforcement large-scale IT systems is the proposed interoperability between the New 
EES and VIS. 
The analysis of the planned systems derives from Commission proposals that are 
in practice based on the mapped perceptions of the Member States and relevant 
stakeholders. It may be challenged by taking into account that expected aims may be 
reached using Automated Border Control systems that are just plans in several Member 
States. 
Besides, it shall not be mistaken that the not optimal operation concerning social 
beneficiality is not the equal to not optimal operation (in general). According to the 
proposed methodological tool, optimal operation in relation to social beneficiality 
depends on the aim of the legislator. In this case, optimum means meeting the three 
proposed indicators sufficiently. 
                                                          
17 See: Boehm, Franziska, Information Sharing and Data Protection, op. cit., here in particular the section 
on cooperation between data protection authorities is relevant, p. 418. 
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In both cases of existing and of planned and other, related systems, the human 
rights related indicator underperformed compared to the established standards. In the 
meantime, transparent operation has been found to be balanced with accountability. 
Therefore, in the current theoretical framework, the planned and the existing systems are 
found not to operate optimal concerning social beneficiality. As undelaying factor, 
reactive security-oriented patterns have been disclosed that are to be counterbalanced by 
a comprehensive use of information power compromising (high) human rights standards. 
Moreover, it is an open question whether the proposed interoperability of New EES with 
VIS catalyses further and enhances interconnectivity among the law enforcement large-
scale IT systems operating in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
Accepting the above limitations, projection capacity of the proposed 
methodological tool is proven due to the revealed same patterns. In this way, observing 
planned and other, related law enforcement large-scale IT systems operating in the area 
of freedom, security and justice, the projection capacity of the proposed methodological 
tool is tested. 
Accepting the limitations, the tool is suited to establish social preferences in 
different time and/or in different circumstances. Due to its standardised nature, changing 
results, i.e. dynamics could be demonstrated. 
The presented systems are results of an intrinsic process whereby new connections 
are established for strengthening the whole structure. The distribution of information 
power and its comprehensive use build a new generation borderline around the area of 
freedom, security and justice. 
Concerning the establishment of eu-LISA, the attitude of the Member States is 
clear. Intelligence always has been a grey byway in democratic systems. Decision-makers 
are interested in a deeper cooperation to increase the efficiency and the amount of the 
stored data and access quality. If an over-regulated process occurs, not only the rights of 
criminals are infringed. Technological and scientific developments make intense control 
possible. The control tries to tackle public security problems. However, this solution 
raises many legal and ethical conflicts as well. Conversely, decision-makers shall 
harmonise their endeavours with the checks and balances of the rule of law. This double 
requirement defines the perceptions of the political players and of the state administration, 
which builds up the surveillant assemblage nature of the operational management of law 
enforcement large-scale IT systems. 
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Legal and irregular migration are two sides of the same regulation field. Law 
enforcement large-scale IT systems approach the end points of legal and irregular 
migration, since they can be used to facilitate and to secure border crossings of EU and 
third country nationals. The smart borders initiative presents the newest endeavours for 
the development of new (and related) large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, 
security and justice. New technologies shall be harnessed to meet all the requirements 
including enhancing security and facilitating travel at the external borders. 
To extend the point of the problem’s interpretation, the society’s acceptance of 
new technologies in criminal justice is crucial to be taken into account. Concerns with a 
new technology will decrease if the technology is fully integrated, accepted in the society. 
Several unanswered question are raised by its combination with the pure type immigration 
control that is envisioned to be a neutral policy facilitating the entry of those who have 
right to enter or reside, and preventing entry and ensuring removal of those without right 
to stay. These questions are clearly connected to the double requirement of enhancing 
security and facilitating travel as it was the key underlying dilemma in the context of the 
current research. The presented results on security and openness of Schengenland may 
help in their strategic assessment, which may be the subject of a further study. 
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